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Abstract	
	The	 great	 recession,	 and	 the	 countercyclical	 responses	 by	 European	 governments	 that	 followed,	triggered	an	extensive	wave	of	fiscal	adjustments.	The	implementation	of	these	austerity	measures,	although	underpinned	by	a	widespread	consensus,	underwent	severe	criticism.	While	their	effects	on	output	 and	 employment	have	been	 extensively	 investigated,	 their	 impacts	 on	wage	 inequality	have	 received	 relatively	 less	 attention.	 In	 this	 paper	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 austerity	measures	 on	 gender	 wage	 inequalities.	 After	 having	 described	 the	 literature-based	 conceptual	framework	of	our	analysis,	we	provide	empirical	evidence	on	the	effects	of	austerity	measures	on:	(i)	 the	 adjusted	 gender	 wage	 gap;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 patterns	 of	 gender	 horizontal	 segregation.	 The	analysis	 covers	 the	 group	of	 EU-28	 countries	 in	 the	 years	 from	2010	 to	 2013.	Results	 show	 that	austerity	measures	(both	tax-based	and	expenditure-based)	impacted	significantly	on	various	sides	of	gender	wage	inequality,	putting	at	risk	the	relatively	little	progress	achieved	in	Europe	so	far.	
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1. Introduction	As	 a	 response	 to	 the	 recent	 economic	 crisis,	 in	 particular	 high	 public	 sector	 deficits	 and	sovereign	 debt	 problems,	 many	 European	 Union	 countries	 implemented	 fiscal	 consolidation	programs.	 The	 largest	 ones	 have	 been	 introduced	 in	 the	 2010-2012	 period	 in	 Hungary,	 Latvia,	Greece,	Ireland,	Spain	and	Portugal	(Theodoropoulou	and	Watt,	2011).	Although	austerity	packages	differed	size	and	structure,	most	of	them	included	measures	on	the	expenditures	side,	in	the	form	of	cuts	 in	 public	 sector	 wages	 and	 employment	 or	 in	 public	 services;	 some	 countries	 embraced	policies	on	the	revenue	side,	such	as	value	added	tax	hikes.	The	effectiveness	of	fiscal	consolidation	policies	on	growth	has	been	extensively	questioned,	as	were	their	effects	on	the	labour	market,	on	inequality	and	on	social	stability.	The	austerity	debate	traces	back	to	the	origins	of	economic	thinking	and,	being	related	to	the	desirable	 size	 of	 the	 state	 intervention	 into	 the	 economy,	 represents	 a	 crucial	 side	 of	 the	juxtaposition	 of	 ideological	 and	 theoretical	 approaches.	 Konzelmann	 (2014)	 provides	 a	 thorough	and	 exhaustive	 overview	 of	 the	 austerity	 debate	 over	 the	 history	 of	 economic	 thinking,	 starting	from	the	different,	historically	based,	positions	of	classical	economist	such	as	Malthus,	Ricardo	and	Marx,	going	through	the	neoclassical	school,	the	Keynesian	era	and	the	growing	dominance,	starting	from	the	70s,	of	the	neo-liberal	ideology.	Based	on	the	latter,	policy	intervention	aimed	at	achieving	full	employment	has	been	progressively	marginalised	while	austerity	has	growingly	been	regarded	as	 a	 crucial	 mean	 to	 facilitate,	 via	 price	 stability,	 the	 macroeconomic	 equilibrium.	 Despite	 the	questionable	 results	 obtained	 by	 neo-liberal	 policies	 in	 favouring	 growth	 patterns,	 support	 for	austerity	packages	 gained	 strength	 and	materialized,	 right	 after	 emergency	monetary	policies,	 as	the	common	response	to	the	great	recession.	Some	influential	studies	provided	the	justification	for	their	 widespread	 adoption;	 illustrative	 examples	 include	 the	 evidence	 that	 excessive	 debt	 is	detrimental	to	growth	(Reinhart	and	Rogoff,	2009)	or	that	fiscal	consolidation	has	an	expansionary	effect	 by	 increasing	 private	 sector	 confidence,	 in	 a	 Ricardian	 equivalence	 logic	 (Alesina	 and	Ardagna,	2010).	These	findings	received	severe	criticism	in	the	following	years	(see,	e.g.,	Herndon	
et	al.,	2014;	Kinsella,	2012;	Considine	and	Duffy,	2016),	with	a	number	of	studies	even	showing	that	austerity	 aggravated	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 recession	 and	 hit	 asymmetrically	 the	 weakest	 social	 and	economic	 groups	 (Crotty,	 2012;	 Donald	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 impact	 of	 fiscal	consolidation	 on	 gender	 inequalities	 represents	 a	 particularly	 interesting	 perspective	 of	 analysis	and	is	the	focus	of	this	paper.	The	crisis	is	reported	to	have	hit	disproportionally	male	employment,	being	its	effects	more	direct	on	the	male-dominated	private	sectors	of	manufacturing,	construction	and	specific	financial	branches	 (Perivier,	 2016).	 However,	 what	 was	 first	 seen	 as	 he-cession	 soon	 after	 moved	 to	sh(e)austerity	 (Karamessini	and	Rubery,	2014).	Austerity	measures	developed	 in	response	 to	 the	crisis	might	have	indeed	impacted	more	women	than	man,	given	the	policy	focus	on	the	reduction	of	 wages	 and	 employment	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 where	 women	 normally	 make	 the	 majority	 of	workforce.	Some	countries	have	introduced	means-testing	for	benefits	for	which	women	previously	had	 independent	 access,	 reduced	 the	 amount	 of	 existing	 child	 benefits	 or	 abolished	 them	
completely.	This	is	placing	an	increasing	burden	on	women	to	manage	household	budget,	especially	for	lone	mothers	(Rubery,	2015a).	Moreover,	cut	in	social	services	and	welfare	provisions	such	as	childcare	 services	 and	 elderly	 care	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 more	 adverse	 effects	 on	 female	employment	at	least	in	two	ways.	First,	women	are	predominantly	employed	in	these	types	of	jobs,	which	affects	their	overall	employment	rates.	Secondly,	given	women’s	role	as	primary	care	givers,	there	 is	 a	 high	 probability	 that	 they	 will	 be	 the	 ones	 to	 leave	 the	 job	 or	 shift	 to	 part-time	employment	when	care	services	are	in	short	supply.	Most	of	austerity	packages	also	included	cut	in	pensions,	penalised	access	to	early	retirement	and	postponed	the	retirement	age.	Reducing	income	support	 for	 the	old	age	 is	of	prime	concern	 for	women,	given	 that	 in	 the	majority	of	EU	member	states	women	aged	50	to	69	form	a	larger	proportion	of	those	receiving	a	pension	compared	to	men	(EIGE,	2015).		The	 pre-crisis	 period	 saw	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 male	 breadwinner	 model	 that	 was	 further	accelerated	during	recession	(Karamessini,	2014a;	Addabbo	et	al.,	2015)	as	male	employment	was	on	 decline	 while,	 unlike	 in	 other	 crisis	 episodes,	 women	 showed	 far	 greater	 attachment	 to	 the	labour	market.	 However,	 income	 losses	 steaming	 from	 either	 employment,	 benefits	 or	 pensions	during	 the	 austerity	 episodes,	 coupled	 with	 reduced	 support	 for	 work/family	 reconciliation	policies,	 are	 expected	 to	 reduce	 female	 bargaining	 power	 within	 the	 household	 and	 reinforce	patriarchal	family	structures	(Perivier,	2016).	In	 examining	 the	 effects	 of	 austerity	 measures	 on	 gender	 inequality,	 most	 of	 the	 to	 date	literature	has	been	dealing	with	the	impact	on	employment.	Their	consequences	on	wage	inequality	have	received	relatively	less	attention,	with	several	papers	looking	only	at	the	raw	gender	pay	gap,	i.e.,	 the	 simple	 difference	 in	 average	 hourly	 earnings	 between	men	 and	women.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	paper	is	to	assess	the	impact	of	austerity	policies	on	the	gender	wage	gap	adjusted	for	the	labour	market	characteristics	of	man	and	women.	In	that	regard,	we	aim	to	investigate	what	is	the	impact	of	austerity	on	pure	discrimination	practices	and	on	the	patterns	of	gender	horizontal	segregation.	While	 the	 available	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 sectorial	 segregation	 has	 sheltered	 women	 from	 job	losses	in	times	of	crisis,	this	paper	intends	to	analyse	if	austerity	measures	reduced	the	chances	for	female	workers	to	be	employed	in	better-paid	jobs.	The	analysis	covers	the	group	of	EU-28	countries	 in	the	years	 from	2010	to	2013	and	makes	use	of	the	European	Union	Survey	on	Income	and	Living	Conditions	(EU-SILC).	The	structure	of	the	article	is	the	following.	After	this	introduction,	the	next	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	evidence	available	so	far	in	the	literature	and	a	discussion	on	the	possible	gender	impacts	of	austerity	policies.	The	third	section	 illustrates	 the	datasets	and	the	variables	used	and	provides	 some	descriptive	evidence	on:	 (i)	 the	 levels	and	components	of	 the	gender	wage	gap	 in	Europe;	 (ii)	 the	 austerity	 measures	 implemented	 in	 the	 period	 considered.	 In	 section	 four	 we	present	 the	econometric	methods,	 the	empirical	model	and	our	results.	Section	 five	discusses	 the	results	and	concludes.	
	
	
2. Crisis,	austerity	and	gender	inequalities	A	 vast	 literature	 addressing	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 on	men	 and	women	 exists	 and	 its	comprehensive	review	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	Instead,	the	next	few	paragraphs	provide	a	 brief	 summary	 of	 the	 central	 issues	 raised	 in	 this	 literature	 which	 prove	 to	 be	 important	 in	understanding	women’s	vulnerability	to	both	recession	and	austerity.	The	position	of	men	and	women	in	the	labour	market,	reflected	in	the	level	of	sectorial	and	occupational	 segregation,	 is	 seen	 as	 critical	 in	 understanding	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 great	recession.	 As	 the	 crisis	 hit	 sectors	where	male	workforce	was	 predominantly	 employed,	 such	 as	construction,	 manufacturing	 and	 certain	 financial	 branches,	 gendered	 effect	 of	 the	 economic	downturn	materialised	into	male	employment	rates	falling	sharply	(by	3	to	4	percentage	points)	at	the	EU27	 level	 in	 the	period	2008	–	2012	 (Rubery,	2015b).	The	 fall	 in	 the	 female	 rate	was	much	more	limited,	up	to	1	percentage	point.	Unemployment	rate	for	women	also	experienced	less	sharp	increase	 than	 for	men	during	 the	 crisis,	 but	 accompanied	by	 a	 slower	 return	 to	 pre-crisis	 values	when	 the	 recovery	 stepped	 in.	 The	 combined	 effects	 of	 employment	 and	 unemployment	 flows	resulted	in	an	increase	in	male	inactivity	rates	and	in	a	slight	reduction	in	female	ones.	This	caused	a	fall	in	all	gender	disparities	in	the	EU	27	in	2012	–	in	employment,	unemployment,	activity	rates,	and	 poverty.	 However,	 it	 has	 been	 emphasised	 that	 this	 was	 not	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 sign	 of	improvement	 in	 gender	 equality,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 fact	 that	men	 have	moved	 closer	 to	women’s	vulnerable	 positions	 due	 to	 deteriorated	 labour	 market	 conditions	 (Bettio	 and	 Verashchagina,	2014;	Perugini,	2016).	Higher	shares	of	men	in	more	precarious	jobs	also	brought	the	convergence	in	 terms	 of	 the	 narrowing	 gender	 gaps	 in	 part-time	 and	 temporary	 work	 in	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	Ireland	(Addabbo	et	al.,	2015;	Ferreira	2014),	and	Spain	(Gonzales	Gago	and	Segales	Kirzner,	2014).	In	 examining	how	 solid	 is	 the	 evidence	 that	 the	 level	 of	 segregation	 contributed	 to	 lower	 female	exposure	 to	 the	 crisis,	 Bettio	 and	 Verashchagina	 (2014)	 found	 a	 statistically	 significant	 negative	correlation	across	countries	between	sectorial	and	occupational	segregation	and	job	losses	suffered	by	 women	 during	 the	 crisis	 for	 the	 EU	 27.	 A	 relatively	 stronger	 correlation	 was	 found	 for	 the	sectorial	segregation	although,	they	note,	correlation	does	not	need	to	indicate	causality.	Austerity	policies,	 targeted	 towards	 the	public	 sector	 in	which	women	are	normally	over-represented,	are	similarly	supposed	to	produce	gendered	effect	(Glasmeier	and	Lee-Chuvala,	2011).		Over	 the	 2008-2014	 period,	 the	 workforce	 downsizing	 in	 key	 public	 sector	 industries	 of	 public	administration,	 education	 and	 health	 ranged	 from	 18%	 and	 16%	 in	 Romania	 and	 Greece,	respectively,	10%	in	Portugal	and	around	7%	in	Spain.	Over	the	same	period,	in	Ireland,	women’s	employment	fell	more	sharply	than	men’s	in	public	administration	(-	7,8%	compared	–	3,7%)	and	rose	 less	 than	 for	men	 in	health	and	education.	 In	 the	UK,	 the	 loss	 in	 full-time	positions	has	been	larger	for	women	than	for	men	in	central	government	jobs:	-22,4%	and	-20,8%,	respectively	(EPSU,	2016).	While	 numerous	 studies	 have	 supported	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 he-cession,	 the	 literature	 that	tries	to	determine	how	widespread	is	“she-austerity”	in	terms	of	job	losses	is	still	very	limited.		On	a	panel	of	eight	EU	countries	with	different	welfare	and	gender	regimes	from	2008	to	2014,	Perivier	(2016)	 shows	 that	 the	 “he-cession	 to	 sh(e)austerity”	 scenario	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 all	 selected	
countries.	The	paper	also	investigates	what	is	the	role	of	employment	segregation	in	the	effects	of	the	 crisis	 and	 of	 austerity	 policies	 on	 the	 employment	 gap.	 Greece	 and	 Spain	 are	 showed	 to	 be	typical	 examples	 of	 the	 “he-cession	 to	 sh(e)austerity”	 scenario	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 gender	employment	gap	throughout	the	whole	period	is	mainly	explained	by	sectorial	segregation.	UK	and	Denmark	 experienced	 slight	 she-cession.	 In	 UK,	 sectorial	 segregation	 had	 little	 or	 no	 role	 in	 the	gendered	impact	of	the	austerity	policies,	while	positive	albeit	small	effect	was	found	in	Denmark.	In	France,	Italy	and	Germany	the	impacts	are	not	clear	and	changes	in	employment	were	even	less	pronounced.	 Sweden	 did	 not	 implement	 austerity	measures,	 while	 the	 stimulus	 packages	 in	 the	crisis	period	have	benefited	more	men	than	women.	Evidence	on	the	impact	of	austerity	measures	on	the	gender	pay	inequality	is	similarly	quite	scarce.	 Fulton	 (2011)	 shows	 that	 in	 Latvia	 women’s	 pay	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 has	 fallen	disproportionately	 as	 a	 result	 of	 austerity	measures,	which	 caused	 gender	 pay	 gap	 in	 the	whole	economy	to	rise	 from	15.2%	in	2008	to	16.9%	in	2011.	 In	Romania,	 the	gender	pay	gap	widened	from	7.8%	in	2008	 to	12.6%	in	2010.	However,	 the	peak	year	 in	austerity	 in	Romania	was	2010,	when	public	sector	wages	were	reduced	by	25%	and	the	restructuring	of	public	sector	employment	was	so	large	that	it	represented	over	half	of	the	number	of	total	government	positions	eliminated	in	the	entire	EU	(Stoiciu,	2012).	Besides	 these	 direct	 effects	 of	 austerity	 on	 gender	 gaps	 in	 employment	 and	wages,	 fiscal	consolidation	policies	could	impact	the	quality	of	labour	supplied	by	women	and,	via	this	channel,	further	 increase	 gender	 inequality.	 Cutting	 budgets	 for	 care	 policies	 aimed	 at	 providing	 an	alternative	to	women’s	unpaid	labour,	could	negatively	 impact	effort,	 flexibility	and	availability	of	female	 labour.	 In	 United	 Kingdom,	 a	 range	 of	 measure	 has	 been	 reducing	 support	 for	 children,	pregnancy	and	childcare.	There	was	a	freeze	in	child	benefits	and	working	tax	credits,	a	reduction	in	 baby	 and	 pregnancy	 related	 grants,	 and	 pressure	 was	 exerted	 on	 lone	 mothers	 (as	 benefit	recipients)	to	increase	their	effort	in	finding	a	job	despite	a	context	of	high	female	unemployment	(Rubery	and	Raferty,	2014).	The	design	of	a	universal	tax	credit,	that	replaced	six	different	benefits,	is	predicted	to	decrease	labour	market	incentives	for	second	earners	in	couples,	most	of	them	being	women.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 turn	 into	 a	 challenge	 to	 financial	 security	 and	 independence	 of	women,	reverting	 the	 process	 of	 welfare	 systems	modernisation	 shaped	 around	 the	 single	 earner	 family	model	and	paving	the	way	for	a	return	of	the	traditional,	male-centred	one	(MacLeavy,	2011).	The	UK	 government	 also	 reduced	 the	 childcare	 element	 of	 tax	 credits	 from	 80%	 to	 70%,	 despite	previous	evidence	showing	that	the	cost	of	childcare	already	made	work	difficult	to	afford	for	many	low	earning	women	and	completely	unaffordable	for	low	earning	single	mothers	(Annesley,	2014).	Similarly,	 in	 Iceland,	 fees	 for	 child-related	 services	have	been	 raised	 remarkably	 and	 the	 amount	paid	during	parental	 leave	 cut	 three	 times	 since	 the	outburst	of	 the	 crisis,	 resulting	 in	 a	 reduced	uptake	of	it	(Thorsdottir,	2014).	In	Spain,	new	born	child	benefits	were	eliminated,	plans	to	invest	in	 pre-primary	 school	 infrastructure	 cancelled	 and	 significant	 cuts	 in	 long-term	 care	 introduced	(Gonzales	Gago	and	Segales	Kirzner,	2014);	in	Italy	austerity	has	paused	the	initiative	of	expanding	child	care	services	(Verashchagina	and	Capparucci,	2014)	leading	to	further	constraints	on	mothers’	
labour	supply	with	a	negative	impact	on	women’s	employment	in	all	sectors	(Addabbo	et	al.,	2015).	In	Greece,	reduction	of	state	budget	allocations	to	municipalities	caused	great	lack	of	staff	in	social	care	services	and	closing	down	of	childcare	facilities	(Karamessini,	2014b).	Portuguese	government	intensified	means	testing,	reduced	coverage	of	certain	benefits	and	cut	family	allowances	(Ferreira,	2014).	 In	 Ireland,	 there	 were	 multiple	 cuts	 to	 child	 benefits	 paid	 directly	 to	 mothers;	 carers’	allowances	claimed	mainly	by	women	looking	after	elderly	or	disabled	relatives	were	reduced	and	the	contraction	in	social	services	resulted	in	fewer	special	needs	assistance	and	less	public	nursing	home	places	(Barry	and	Conroy,	2014). Austerity	measures	developed	in	response	to	the	crisis	have	therefore	led	to	a	retrenchment	of	 the	welfare	 state	 in	 child	 care	 and	 long-term	 care	 services,	which	 put	 pressure	 on	 families	 to	provide	 informal	welfare	support,	usually	materialising	 in	 the	 form	of	 female	unpaid	 labour.	This	could	 have	 affected	 the	 flexibility	 of	 female	 labour	 supply,	 reduced	 women’s	 chances	 to	 be	employed	 in	 better-paid	 sectors	 and,	 in	 the	 longer	 term,	 even	 challenged	 the	 achieved	 levels	 of	integration	 into	 the	 labour	 market.	 While	 sectorial	 segregation	 has	 reduced	 the	 vulnerability	 of	women	 in	 the	 recession	 period,	 its	 particular	 features	 -	 women’s	 greater	 reliance	 on	 the	 public	sector,	 that	 is	 everywhere	 considered	 as	 less	 affected	 by	 discriminatory	 practices	 and	 that	 has	started	shrinking	during	the	fiscal	consolidation	phase	–	also	likely	reduced	the	achieved	levels	of	overall	 gender	 equality	 and	 endangered	 women’s	 emancipation	 and	 autonomy	 through	 a	 more	limited	contribution	of	women	to	household	income	(Ferreira,	2014).	Based	on	all	these	considerations,	it	is	plausible	that	fiscal	consolidation	plans	significantly	weakened	 the	position	of	women	 in	 the	 labour	market	by	 imposing	 them,	via	widespread	cuts	 in	care	 services,	heavier	 family	working	 loads.	The	 resulting	 lower	effort,	 availability,	 flexibility	and	continuity	 that	women	are	presumably	able	to	offer	might	have	 fed	an	adjustment	downwards	of	employers	expectations	with	regards	to	their	average	expected	level	of	productivity.	Along	with	the	consequent	 expectations	 of	 higher	 variability	 of	 productivity	 for	 women	 and	 in	 conditions	 of	incomplete	information	on	the	characteristics	of	individual	workers,	this	might	have	increased	the	scope	 for	 the	 so-called	 statistical	 discrimination	 on	 the	 labour	 market	 (Phelps,	 1954).	 In	 the	absence	 of	 complete	 information	 on	 individual	 counterparts,	 the	 employers,	 relying	 on	 group	average	 characteristics,	 reacted	 to	 the	 expected	 higher	 variability	 and	 lower	 levels	 of	 women’s	productivity	 by	 paying	 lower	 wages	 or	 limiting	 their	 access	 to	 high-pay	 jobs	 (which	 normally	require	 more	 flexibility,	 continuity	 and	 effort).	 Under	 this	 perspective,	 austerity	 episodes	 might	have	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 significant	 turning	 points	 for	 gender	 relations,	 employment	 and	welfare	 states.	 This	 can	 be	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 countries	 where	 the	 move	 away	 from	 the	traditional	patriarchal	family	structure	and	towards	a	dual	earner	model	is	more	recent	and	where	social	 norms	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 women’s	 role	 in	 the	 family	 and	 economy	 are	 not	 firm	enough	to	resist	cyclical	policy	changes	(Rubery,	2014,	p	23).		
	
	
	
3. Data,	variables	and	preliminary	descriptive	evidence	
3.1 Data	and	variables	Our	 empirical	 analysis	 covers	 the	 28	 EU	member	 countries	 in	 the	 years	 from	2010	 to	 2013	(2011-2014	 cross-section	 releases	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 Statistics	 on	 Income	 and	 Living	Conditions	-	EU-SILC).	The	number	of	 individuals,	aged	between	16	and	65	years,	 included	 in	 the	total	sample	is	1,304,520.	Of	them,	677,702	are	employed	as	dependent	workers	and	are	the	object	of	our	empirical	analysis	on	the	gender	wage	gap	and	on	the	impact	of	austerity	measures	(see	table	1	and	A1	in	the	appendix	for	the	country/year	details).	The	remaining	626,818	individuals	(not	in	employment,	 in	 education,	 self-employed	 or	 retired)	 are	 used	 in	 the	 estimates	 to	 account	 and	correct	 for	sample	selection	bias.	Due	 to	 the	well-known	challenges	posed	by	self-employment	 in	terms	 of	 income	 data	 availability	 and	 reliability,	 we	 decided	 not	 to	 include	 this	 segment	 of	 the	labour	market	in	our	analysis.	Employees’	 income	 (variable	PY010G)	 is	defined	as	 the	gross	 total	 (yearly)	 remuneration,	 in	cash	or	in	kind,	payable	by	an	employer	to	an	employee	in	return	for	the	work	done	in	the	reference	period.	 It	 includes	 wages	 and	 salaries	 paid	 in	 cash,	 holiday	 payments,	 thirteenth	 month	 and	overtime	payment,	profit	sharing,	bonuses	and	productivity	premia,	allowances	paid	for	transport	or	for	working	in	remote	locations,	as	well	as	the	social	contributions	and	income	taxes	payable	by	employees.	 The	 use	 of	 gross	 wages	 is	 common	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 considers	 within-countries	wage	and	earnings	inequality	(Antonczyk	et	al.,	2010)	and	employs	EU-SILC	data	(Brandolini	et	al.,	2010).	In	order	to	account	for	differences	in	hours	worked,	we	computed	all	earning	measures	on	hourly	basis	using	the	information	on	the	number	of	hours	usually	worked	per	week	in	the	main	job	and	the	number	of	months	spent	at	work.	Top	and	bottom	1%	of	the	hourly	wage	distributions	in	each	country	and	year	were	trimmed	in	order	to	avoid	distortions	by	outliers.	All	monetary	values	are	expressed	in	2015	Euro	PPPs.	As	 explanatory	 variables	 of	 wages,	 besides	 the	 gender	 of	 the	 worker,	 we	 use	 a	 large	 set	 of	individual	 information	which	 include:	 education	 (primary,	 secondary	 and	 tertiary,	 corresponding	to	the	ISCED	classification	levels	0-2,	3-4,	and	5-6,	respectively),	employment	status	(temporary	or	permanent),	age	(and	its	square),	marital	status,	self-reported	health	status	(on	a	1-very	good	to	5-very	bad	scale),	place	of	residence	(urban/non-urban	region),	presence	of	a	second	job,	control	for	part-time	 employment,	 type	 of	 occupation,	 sector	 and	 size	 of	 the	 firm	 in	which	 the	 individual	 is	employed1.	
																																																								1	Occupations	 are	 classified	 into	 nine	 categories,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 major	 groups	 of	 the	 ISCO	 08	 classification:	 1.	Managers,	2.	Professionals,	3.	Technicians	and	Associate	Professionals,	4.	Clerical	Support	Workers,	5.	Services	and	Sales	Workers,	6.	Skilled	Agricultural,	Forestry	and	Fishery	Workers,	7.	Craft	and	Related	Trade	Workers,	8.	Plant	and	Machine	Operators	and	Assemblers,	9.	Elementary	Occupations.	Workers	in	Armed	Forces	Occupations,	consisting	of	a	very	limited	number	of	 individuals,	have	been	aggregated	 into	category	2.	 Industry	breakdown	has	been	 limited	to	thirteen	sectors,	obtained	 as	 an	 aggregation	 of	 the	NACE	 sections:	 1.	 Agriculture	 (section	 A),	 2.	 Industry	 (B-E),	 3.	 Constructions	 (F),	 4.	Trade	 (G),	 5.	 Transports	 (H),	 6.	 Hotels	 and	 Restaurants	 (I),	 7.	 Information	 and	 Communications	 (J),	 8.	 Financial	 and	Insurance	Activities	(K),	9.	Real	Estate,	Professional	and	Administrative	Activities	(L-N),	10.	Public	Administration	(O),	11.	
As	regards	the	identification	of	austerity	measures,	we	adopt	here	the	conventional	approach	based	 on	 the	 use	 of	 the	 cyclically	 adjusted	 primary	 balance	 (CAPB).	 Changes	 in	 the	 cyclically	adjusted	budget	balance	have	been	extensively	used	in	the	literature	to	identify	fiscal	consolidation	episodes;	 earlier	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Alesina	 and	 Perotti,	 1995	 and	 1997;	 Alesina	 and	 Ardagna,	 1998)	made	 use	 of	 the	 so-called	 Blanchard	 index	 (calculated	 assuming	 unchanged	 unemployment	 rate	with	respect	 to	 the	previous	year).	More	recent	contributions	(e.g.,	Tsibouris	et	al.,	2006;	Molnar,	2012;	Perivier,	2016),	prefer	CAPB-based	measures,	after	having	acknowledged	 its	 shortcomings.	They	are	primarily	related	to	 the	 fact	 that	CAPB	might	reflect	one-offs	(Koen	and	van	den	Noord,	2005),	growth	surprises	(Larch	and	Salto,	2005)	and	fluctuations	on	the	revenues	side	due	to	the	dynamics	of	asset	prices	(Girouard	and	Price,	2004).	As	explained	by	Gujardo	et	al.	(2014),	changes	in	 cyclically	 adjusted	 fiscal	 variables	might	 also	 incorporate	 developments	 affecting	 total	 output	that	 are	 not	 related	 to	 discretionary	 policy	 changes.	 In	 analyses	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 the	expansionary/contractionary	 effects	 of	 fiscal	 consolidations,	 this	 poses	 a	 serious	 issue	 of	identification:	 a	 boom	 in	 the	 stock	market,	 for	 example,	 not	 only	 improves	 the	 CAPB,	 but	 is	 also	likely	to	boost	consumption	and	investments,	 therefore	downplaying	the	contractionary	effects	of	fiscal	 consolidations.	 Similarly,	 the	 policy	 measure	 could	 be	 targeted	 at	 reducing	 the	 risk	 of	overheating,	posing	a	severe	reverse	causality	issue.	In	order	to	overcome	these	shortcomings,	the	literature	suggests	an	alternative	approach,	based	on	 the	 identification	of	 changes	 in	 fiscal	policy	directly	from	historical	documents	(see,	for	examples,	Romer	and	Romer,	2010;	Devries	et	al.,	2011; Gujardo	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 and	 the	 references	 cited	 therein).	 In	 our	 case,	 the	 large	 number	 of	countries/years	 considered	 limits	 the	 feasibility	of	 this	narrative	approach;	at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	focus	of	our	study	(impact	of	fiscal	consolidation	on	the	gender	gap,	instead	of	growth)	lessens	the	importance	 of	 identification	 and	 reverse	 causality	 issues.	 To	 address	 the	 remaining	 concerns	(distortionary	 effects	 of	 cut-offs),	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 OECD	 definition	 of	 underlying	 primary	balance,	we adjust the CAPB for the effects of one-off budget operations (typical examples of them are 
tax amnesties or revenues from privatizations).	 Our	 source	 of	 data	 is	 the	 Ameco	 database2,	 which	provides	 for	 the	 EU	 countries	 information	 on	 the	 structural	 (i.e.,	 net	 of	 one-offs	 and	 temporary	measures)	balance	of	general	government	(excluding	interests),	with	cyclical	adjustment	based	on	potential	GDP	excessive	deficit	procedure	(see	Mourre	et	al.,	2003).	Data	for	this	measure	of	CAPB	for	the	EU-28	countries	are	directly	available	in	the	Ameco	website	starting	from	2010;	for	previous	years,	 the	 datasets	 provides	 separated	 information	 on	 cyclically	 adjusted	 revenues	 and	expenditures	 (excluding	 interest),	 but	 not	 on	 one-offs	 and	 temporary	measures.	 However,	 since	according	 to	 our	 conceptual	 framework	 the	 effects	 of	 austerity	 measure	 on	 the	 GWG	 might	 be	lagged	one	or	more	years,	we	also	need	information	on	fiscal	consolidations	implemented	prior	to	2010	 (see	 section	 4).	 We	 therefore	 reconstructed	 the	 CAPB	 change	 using	 the	 data	 on	 one-off	
																																																																																																																																																																																		Education	 (P),	 12.	 Health	 and	 Social	Work	 Activities	 (Q),	 13.	 Other	 services	 (R-U).	 Lastly,	we	 consider	 three	 firm	 size	classes:	0-10,	11-49,	50	and	over	employees.	2	See:	http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm	
measures	derived	from	OECD	(2016)3	to	correct	the	cyclically	adjusted	revenues	and	expenditures	data	provided	in	AMECO	for	the	years	2006-2009.	
 
3.2 The	gender	wage	gap	in	EU-28	and	its	components	Prior	 to	 the	 investigation	of	 the	effects	of	austerity,	we	present	some	descriptive	evidence	on	the	gender	wage	gap	levels	and	trends	in	the	EU-28.	In	order	to	assess	the	gender	wage	gap	and	its	components,	 we	 use	 a	 standard	 twofold	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 approach	 (Oaxaca,	 1973).	 The	decomposition,	based	on	separate	earnings	equations	for	women	and	men,	splits	the	difference	in	the	average	(log)	hourly	wages	between	men	and	women	(the	unadjusted	gender	wage	gap)	4,	into	the	explained	and	the	unexplained	parts	(Jann,	2008):		 𝑦! − 𝑦!!"#$%&'()$ !"# !"# =  𝑋!! − 𝑋!! !𝜃!∗!"#$%&'() !"#$ !" !!! !"# + (𝑋!!
! 𝜃!! − 𝜃!∗ + 𝑋!!! 𝜃!∗ − 𝜃!! ) !"#$%&'("#) !"#$ !" !!! !"#(!"#$%&'" !"# !"#) ,	 	k	=1,	2,	…	K.	 	 [1]		where		𝑦! 	and	𝑦! 	are	female	and	male	log	wages,		𝑋!! 	and	𝑋!! 	are	the	vectors	of	average	female	and	male	 workers’	 and	 jobs	 characteristics	 (education,	 work	 experience,	 etc.);	𝜃!! 	and	𝜃!! 	are	 the	returns	 to	 these	 characteristics	 from	 the	 two	earnings	 equations;	 an	𝜃!∗ 	is	 the	vector	of	 reference	coefficients	(returns),	introduced	to	estimate	the	explained	and	the	unexplained	part	independently	from	the	group	viewpoint	(Jann,	2008).	We	further	follow	Jann	(2008)	in	using	the	coefficients	from	the	 pooled	 model	 for	 both	 genders	 (with	 gender	 included	 as	 a	 covariate)	 as	 the	 reference	coefficients	 for	 the	decomposition5.	The	 first	part	of	 the	right	side	 in	 the	equation	1,	 traditionally	called	the	explained	part	(endowments	effect),	represents	the	differences	in	average	labour	market	characteristics	between	 the	genders	 (𝑋!! − 𝑋!!),	weighted	by	 the	 reference	 coefficients	𝜃!∗ .	 If	men	have	 better	 labour	 market	 characteristics	 than	 women	 (e.g.,	 higher	 average	 education,	 more	working	experience,	etc.),	a	part	of	the	unadjusted	gap	could	be	explained	by	higher	values	of	these	characteristics.	However,	 if	women	have	better	 labour	market	 characteristics	 than	men,	 this	part	would	be	negative	and	the	differences	in	characteristics,	instead	of	explaining,	would	actually	hide	the	"true"	size	of	the	gap	(Vladisavljević	et	al.,	2015).	The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 right	 side	 of	 the	 equation	 1	 is	 the	 unexplained	 part	 of	 the	 gap	(coefficients	effect),	which	represents	the	gender	differences	in	returns	to	characteristics,	weighted																																																									3	See:	http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economic-outlook-annex-tables.htm		4	Log	 transformations	are	usual	 in	 the	analysis	of	wages,	 as	 they	usually	have	asymmetric	distribution	and	need	to	be	transformed	in	order	to	perform	parametric	estimations.	Additionally,	the	difference	in	log	wages	is	 approximately	equal	 to	per	 cent	difference	between	 the	groups	 (e.g.,	Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2010,	p.	86),	which	enables	easier	interpretation	of	results.	5	We	use	STATA	user-written	oaxaca	command	(Jann,	2008).	We	opted	for	twofold	pooled	decomposition	as	its	results	are	compatible	with	the	estimation	of	the	austerity	effects.	The	estimated	unexplained	part	of	the	gap	in	Table	1	for	the	pooled	sample	is	therefore	equal	the	estimate	of	the	gender	wage	gap	in	Table	2	(first	column).	
by	 average	male	 and	 female	 characteristics6,	 but	 also	 the	 unobservable	 differences	 between	 the	genders	(Avlijaš	et	al.,	2013).	This	part	is	also	called	adjusted	gender	wage	gap,	as	it	represents	the	differences	in	wages	between	the	genders	for	the	same	job/worker	characteristics	as	described	by	the	available	information,	and	is	often	attributed	to	discrimination	(Altonji	and	Blank,	1999).	The	decomposition	is	estimated	on	the	pooled	data	set	for	the	28	EU	countries,	for	all	four	years	(controlling	for	country	and	time	effects),	as	well	as	for	each	year	separately	(controlling	for	country	 effects)	 (see	 Table	 1).	 Additionally,	 we	 perform	 the	 same	 analysis	 at	 country	 level	 and	present	the	levels	of	the	adjusted	wage	gap	in	Table	A1	in	the	Appendix.	Besides	gender,	we	control	for	age	(and	its	square),	marital	and	health	status,	urban/non-urban	region	of	residence,	education,	permanent	 or	 temporary	 employment	 status,	 second	 job,	 part-time	 job	 position,	 sector	 of	employment,	occupation,	and	size	of	the	firm.	We	also	control	for	selection	effects,	as	the	selection	of	 employees	 from	 the	 sample	 of	 working	 age	 individuals	 could	 be	 non-random	 and	 therefore	produce	biases	in	the	estimation	of	the	coefficients	from	the	wage	equations.	In	the	field	of	gender	studies,	 a	 growing	 literature	 has	 recognized	 that	 employed	 women	 tend	 to	 have	 -	 more	 often	 -	characteristics	 normally	 associated	 to	 high	wages	 (De	 la	 Rica	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Heckman,	 1979).	 As	 a	consequence,	 low	 female	 employment	 rates	may	 become	 consistent	 with	 low	 gender	wage	 gaps	simply	because	low-wage	women	would	not	feature	in	the	observed	wage	distribution.	Differences	in	 participation	 in	 employment	may	 result	 from	 a	 number	 of	 factors,	 especially	 at	 cross-country	level	 (Albrecht	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 They	 include	 differences	 in	 labour	 supply	 behaviour	 related	 to	household	structure	or	social	norms,	and	in	institutional	settings	such	as	unionization	or	minimum	wages	 (Olivetti	 and	 Petrolongo,	 2008).	 To	 account	 for	 the	 selection	 effects	 we	 use	 a	 correction	based	 on	 the	 Heckman	 two-stage	 method	 (Heckman,	 1979).	 We	 first	 estimate	 the	 first	 stage	participation	 equation,	 separately	 for	 each	 country,	 year	 and	 gender.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 already	described	personal	 characteristics	 (age,	marital	 and	health	 status,	 settlement	 and	 education),	we	add	variables	related	to	household	structure	that	we	were	able	to	build	considering	the	information	available	in	EU-SILC.	They	refer	to	the	household	size	and	to	the	number	of	children	(less	than	3,	4-6	and	7-15	years	old)	and	of	elderly	(65-74	and	over	75	years	old).	Based	on	the	estimates	from	the	probit	equation	we	compute	the	inverse	Mills	ratio	(IMR)	as	a	ratio	between	the	probability	density	function	to	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	a	distribution	(Wooldridge,	2002).	In	the	second	step	we	add	the	IMR	and	its	square	to	the	list	of	the	covariates	in	the	Blinder-Oaxaca	distribution	(equation	1).		The	 difference	 in	 log	 hourly	 wages	 between	 the	 genders,	 which	 equals	 the	 unadjusted	gender	wage	gap,	is	estimated	at	13.6	per	cent,	with	large	variations	across	countries:	from	below	6	per	cent	 in	Lithuania,	Slovenia	and	Poland,	to	above	25	per	cent	 in	Cyprus,	Estonia	and	Denmark.	
																																																								6	In	the	pooled	specification	the	differences	are	split	into	two	components:	differences	in	male	and	reference	coefficients,	 weighted	 by	 male	 characteristics	𝑋!!! 𝜃!! − 𝜃!∗ 	and	 differences	 in	 female	 and	 reference				coefficients,	weighted	by	female	characteristics	𝑋!!! 𝜃!∗ − 𝜃!! .		
The	gap	was	relatively	stable	between	2010	and	2013	(Table	1)	and	the	same	holds	for	the	majority	of	countries7.		
	
Table	 1.	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 of	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 (pooled	 sample,	 EU-28	
countries)	
	 Overall	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	Male	log	wages	 2.435***	 (0.001)	 2.434***	 (0.002)	 2.436***	 (0.002)	 2.435***	 (0.002)	 2.436***	 (0.002)	Female	log	wages	 2.299***	 (0.001)	 2.298***	 (0.002)	 2.300***	 (0.002)	 2.299***	 (0.002)	 2.300***	 (0.002)	Difference	 0.136***	 (0.002)	 0.136***	 (0.003)	 0.137***	 (0.003)	 0.136***	 (0.003)	 0.137***	 (0.003)	Explained	 -0.027***	 (0.002)	 -0.029***	 (0.003)	 -0.029***	 (0.003)	 -0.026***	 (0.003)	 -0.024***	 (0.003)	Unexplained	 0.163***	 (0.001)	 0.165***	 (0.002)	 0.166***	 (0.002)	 0.162***	 (0.002)	 0.160***	 (0.002)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Explained	part	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	age	 -0.006***	 (0.000)	 -0.006***	 (0.000)	 -0.006***	 (0.000)	 -0.006***	 (0.000)	 -0.006***	 (0.000)	health	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.000***	 (0.000)	 0.000***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	urban	 -0.001***	 (0.000)	 -0.001***	 (0.000)	 -0.001***	 (0.000)	 -0.001***	 (0.000)	 -0.001***	 (0.000)	married	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.000***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	edu	 -0.016***	 (0.000)	 -0.016***	 (0.000)	 -0.016***	 (0.000)	 -0.015***	 (0.000)	 -0.015***	 (0.000)	occupation	 -0.026***	 (0.001)	 -0.024***	 (0.001)	 -0.028***	 (0.001)	 -0.026***	 (0.001)	 -0.026***	 (0.001)	sector	 0.018***	 (0.000)	 0.014***	 (0.001)	 0.019***	 (0.001)	 0.021***	 (0.001)	 0.021***	 (0.001)	temp1	 0.003***	 (0.000)	 0.003***	 (0.000)	 0.002***	 (0.000)	 0.002***	 (0.000)	 0.003***	 (0.000)	partime	 -0.007***	 (0.000)	 -0.010***	 (0.001)	 -0.006***	 (0.001)	 -0.005***	 (0.001)	 -0.006***	 (0.001)	secjob	 -0.000***	 (0.000)	 -0.000	 (0.000)	 -0.000	 (0.000)	 -0.000**	 (0.000)	 -0.000	 (0.000)	size	 0.006***	 (0.000)	 0.006***	 (0.000)	 0.006***	 (0.000)	 0.005***	 (0.000)	 0.006***	 (0.000)	IMR	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	 0.001***	 (0.000)	country	 -0.000	 (0.001)	 0.004	 (0.002)	 -0.001	 (0.002)	 -0.003	 (0.002)	 -0.002	 (0.002)	time	 0.000***	 (0.000)	 -	
	
-	
	
-	
	
-	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 677,902	 		 171,455	 		 173,125	 		 166,362	 		 166,960	 		
Note:	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	Unexplained	part	of	the	gap	detailed	analysis	available	upon	request.	***,	**	and	
*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	cent	level,	respectively.	
	 The	negative	coefficient	for	the	explained	part	of	the	gap	in	Table	1	(-0.027)	indicates	that	the	 gender	wage	 differences	 between	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	 better	 characteristics	 of	men.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 facts,	women	 have	 on	 average	 better	 characteristics	 than	men,	 so	 the	 adjusted	 gender	wage	 gap	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 unadjusted	 one.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 trends	 for	 the	 unadjusted	 gap,	 the	explained	part	and	the	adjusted	wage	gap	(both	overall	and	by	countries)	vary	very	little	over	time	(Figure	1)8.	The	 negative	 sign	 of	 the	 explained	 part	 of	 the	 gap	 is	 also	 the	 result	 of	 differences	 in	 the	decomposition	 between	 western	 economies	 and	 transition	 countries	 (Figure	 1).	 Namely,	 in	 the																																																									7	The	unadjusted	gap	increased	in	Lithuania	(from	0	to	9.9	per	cent),	and	decreased	in	Cyprus	(from	37.6	to	25.1	per	cent)	and	Luxemburg	(from	12.8	 to	4.1	per	cent),	while	 in	all	other	countries	 the	changes	are	not	statistically	 significant.	Detailed	 results	of	 the	BO	decomposition	country	by	country	are	not	 reported	here	but	they	are	available	upon	request.	8	The	explained	part	of	the	gap	decreased	in	Hungary	(from	-0.06	to	-0.023)	and	in	Sweden	(from	-0.094	to	0.002).	On	the	other	hand,	the	adjusted	gender	wage	gap	decreased	in	Cyprus	(from	26	to	18.4	per	cent)	and	in	Greece	(from	14.2	to	5.7	per	cent).	In	all	other	countries	the	changes	of	the	explained	part	or	the	adjusted	wage	gap	are	insignificant.	
majority	 of	 the	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 economies	 (Lithuania,	 Slovenia,	 Poland,	 Latvia,	Croatia,	Hungary,	Bulgaria,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	 in	 the	Check	Republic	and	Slovakia),	but	also	 in	Portugal	 and	 Denmark,	 the	 explained	 part	 is	 negative,	 signalling	 better	 labour	 market	characteristics	for	women.	On	the	other	hand,	in	the	majority	of	the	western	economies	(Germany,	Austria,	United	Kingdom,	France,	Netherlands	and	Finland,	but	also	in	Cyprus),	the	explained	part	is	positive,	indicating	that	men	have	better	labour	market	characteristics	than	women.		
Figure	1.	Explained	and	unexplained	gender	wage	gap	in	EU-28	countries	(2010	and	2013)	
	
2010	
	
2013	
	
Note:	Our	elaborations	on	EU-SILC	data		 Our	 results	 confirm	previous	 findings	on	 the	differences	between	western	economies	and	transition	countries	(see	Avlijaš	et	al.,	2013,	 for	an	overview).	While	 the	unadjusted	gender	wage	gap	 is	 relatively	 large	 in	 the	 west,	 a	 part	 of	 the	 gap	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 better	 labour	 market	characteristics	 of	men	 and	 the	 adjusted	 gap	 is	 lower	 than	 the	 unadjusted.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	transition	countries,	the	unadjusted	gender	wage	gap	is	relatively	smaller,	but	its	true	size	is	hidden	by	better	 female	 labour	market	characteristics,	 so	 the	adjusted	gap	 is	higher	 than	 the	unadjusted	(see	Table	A1).	The	decomposition	for	Central	and	Eastern	EU	countries	is	different	due	to	a	large	number	of	 low-skilled	female	exits	from	the	labour	market	during	the	transition,	which	increased	
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the	average	skill	 levels	of	employed	women,	 therefore	making	them	better	skilled	then	employed	men	on	average.	As	a	consequence	of	the	described	differences	in	the	components	of	the	gap,	in	the	majority	of	 transition	economies	 the	adjusted	gender	wage	gap	 is	above	average	(Estonia,	Latvia,	Check	Republic,	Slovakia,	Bulgaria,	and	Lithuania),	while	in	the	majority	of	the	western	economies	the	adjusted	gap	is	below	average	(Germany,	Austria,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom).	Although	the	adjusted	gaps	also	vary	significantly	across	countries	(from	below	10	per	cent	in	Greece,	France	and	Luxemburg,	to	above	20	per	cent	in	Estonia,	Czech	Republic	and	Cyprus),	the	differences	are	lower	than	for	the	unadjusted	gap,	indicating	a	converging	impact	of	differences	in	characteristics	(Figure	1	and	Table	A1	in	Appendix).	Both	 the	explained	and	 the	unexplained	part	of	 the	gap	can	be	 further	disaggregated	 into	the	 contributions	 of	 individual	 predictors,	 as	 the	 total	 of	 each	 component	 is	 the	 sum	 of	 the	individual	contributions	of	the	predictors	(Jann,	2008).	This	piece	f	 information	is	reported	in	the	bottom	part	of	Table	1.	The	negative	sign	of	the	explained	part	of	the	gap	is	the	result	of	two	groups	of	factors	with	opposing	effects.	The	first	one	contains	the	labour	market	characteristics	which	are	in	 favour	 of	 women.	 They,	 on	 average,	 work	 in	 better-paid	 occupations,	 have	 higher	 levels	 of	education,	and	work	more	frequently	as	part-time	workers	(which	is	"better"	as	it	is	paid	more	in	the	 terms	 of	 hourly	wages).	 Additionally,	 employed	women	 are	 on	 average	 older	 then	 employed	men,	 which	 grants	 them	 higher	 wages	 due	 to	 longer	 working	 experience.	 The	 second	 group	 of	factors	consists	of	the	characteristics	that	describe	male	advantages	on	the	labour	market.	Men,	on	average,	work	in	better-paid	sectors,	more	frequently	in	larger	companies,	and	are	employed	more	on	permanent	contracts.	The	main	driver	of	this	advantage	is	for	men	the	fact	that	they	work	more	frequently	 in	 better-paid	 sectors.	 This	 difference,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 explains	 13	 per	 cent	 of	 the	unadjusted	wage	gap	(0.018	of	0.136,	 the	 total	wage	differential)	and	 increases	significantly	over	time:	 from	 10.3	 per	 cent	 (0.014	 of	 0.136)	 in	 2010	 to	 15.3	 per	 cent	 (0.021	 of	 0.137)	 in	 2013,	indicating	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 sectorial	 segregation	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 became	 more	pronounced.	
	
3.3 Austerity	in	EU-28	and	the	gender	wage	gap:	preliminary	evidence	The	geography	of	austerity	in	the	years	of	the	crisis	in	EU-28	countries	is	illustrated	in	Table	A2	in	the	Appendix;	the	table	describes	the	annual	change	of	the	cyclically	adjusted	primary	balance	(CAPB)	 over	 the	 period	 2007–2013.	 Despite	 its	 limitations,	 discussed	 in	 section	 3.1,	 the	 CAPB	approach	 is	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 picture	 of	 austerity	 in	 Europe	 largely	 consistent	 with	 existing	empirical	 evidence	 (see,	 for	 example,	Rubery,	 2015b;	Addabbo	 et	 al.,	 2015;	Theodoropoulou	 and	Watt,	 2011).	 According	 to	 these	 data,	 already	 starting	 from	2009,	 but	 especially	 in	 the	 following	years,	 the	 majority	 of	 countries	 adopted	 fiscal	 consolidation	 measures.	 Particularly	 sharp	reductions	 of	 government	 deficits	 were	 implemented	 in	 countries	 like	 Greece,	 Spain,	 Portugal,	Ireland,	Czech	Republic,	Romania,	Latvia	and	Slovenia.	On	 the	opposite	 side,	Finland	and	Sweden	did	not	introduce	any	fiscal	adjustments.	Diagrams	in	Figure	2	report	the	cumulated	change	of	the	CAPB	over	three	years	period,	from	2007	to	2013.		
	
Figure	 2.	 Austerity	 plans	 in	 Euro-28	 countries,	 2007-2013	 (three	 years	 cumulative	 CAPB	
changes)	
	
	 	
	 	
	
	
Note:	Our	elaborations	on	AMECO	and	OECD	(2016)	data	
	 This	measure,	instead	of	the	annual	change,	is	able	to	provide	a	more	illustrative	picture	of	the	 implementation	of	 fiscal	adjustments;	a	 reduction	of	government	deficit	 in	one	year	might	be	compensated	(and	therefore	its	effects	partially	neutralised)	by	a	surplus	in	the	following	years.	A	cumulative	 index	 provides	 therefore	 a	 more	 robust	 identification	 of	 austerity	 measures	 of	 a	structural	nature.	The	diagrams	in	Figure	2	clearly	show	how	the	situation	evolved	over	the	period	considered,	with	a	growing	number	of	countries	moving	towards	the	 implementation	of	austerity	measure,	 with	 the	 exceptions,	 already	 mentioned,	 of	 Finland	 and	 Sweden.	 All	 remaining	 EU	
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countries,	 sooner	 or	 later	 and	 to	 different	 extents,	 went	 into	 some	 government	 balance	consolidation	mechanisms.		
Figure		3.	Adjusted	gender	wage	gap	and	austerity	plans	(three	years	cumulative	CAPB	lagged	
one	year)		
	
	 	
	 	
Note:	Our	elaborations	on	EU-SILC;	AMECO	and	OECD	(2016)	data		 Figure	 3	 provides	 a	 first	 snapshot	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 interest	 in	 the	paper.	 Each	 panel	 plots	 the	 relationship	 between	 adjusted	 gender	 wage	 gap	 in	 year	 t	 and	 the	cumulative	three	years	CAPB	change	lagged	one	year	(to	from	t-1	to	t-3).	As	explained	in	detail	 in	section	4.1,	the	use	of	lags	for	policy/institutional	variables	is	a	common	practice	in	the	literature	and	is	motivated,	among	other	things	(e.g.,	potential	risks	of	endogenity),	by	the	fact	that	the	effects	
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of	 policies/reforms	 are	 not	 immediate	 and	 take	 time	 to	 unfold.	 In	 all	 panels	 of	 Figure	 3	 a	 direct	relation	can	be	observed	(as	approximated	by	the	interpolation	line)	between	austerity	and	gender	wage	 inequality,	although	 the	positive	coefficient	 is	statistically	significant	 in	only	2	years	 (out	of	four).	The	relationship	depicted	 in	the	diagrams	is	by	 its	nature	 inconclusive,	since	many	country	level	factors,	besides	the	potential	role	of	austerity,	could	impact	on	the	gender	gap.	For	this	reason,	we	 have	 to	 go	 into	 some	 methodological	 refinements,	 described	 in	 the	 following	 section.	Nonetheless,	the	results	displayed	in	Figure	3	corroborate	the	idea	of	austerity	being	associated	to	a	deterioration	of	gender	equality.	
 
4. The	impact	of	austerity	measures	on	the	gender	wage	gap	
4.1 Econometric	methods	and	empirical	model	In	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 impact	 of	 austerity	 measures	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap,	 we	 start	 by	estimating	 a	 wage	 equation,	 in	 which	 the	 log	 hourly	 wage	 (lhwage)	 is	 explained	 by	 a	 set	 of	observable	characteristics	of	the	worker	and	of	her/his	employment	position.	The	gender	dummy	(female	 =	 1)	 provides,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 per	 cent	 residual	 gender	 earnings	 gap	(Newell	and	Reilly,	2001;	Perugini	and	Selezneva,	2015).	The	microeconomic	model	of	the	determinants	of	wages	relies	on	the	human	capital	approach	as	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	 earnings	 function	 (Becker,	 1964;	 Mincer,	 1958).	 Higher	 labour	incomes	are	therefore	associated,	first	of	all,	to	accumulated	(formal)	education.	Other	explanatory	variables	are:	age,	which	is	a	proxy	for	experience	and,	as	usual,	 is	 included	in	its	quadratic	term;	permanent	or	temporary	employment	status;	marital	status;	health	status;	urban/non-urban	region	of	residence;	second	job;	full-time	job	position;	sector	of	employment;	occupation;	size	of	the	firm.	This	 wide	 range	 of	 information	 allows	 interpreting	 the	 gender	 dummy	 variable	 (female)	 as	 a	measure	of	the	discrimination	effect	due	to	gender,	once	all	remaining	(observable)	characteristics	are	 controlled	 for.	 This	 approach,	 as	 any	other	 relying	 on	 a	 statistical	 residual,	 is	 exposed	 to	 the	question	as	to	whether	all	the	necessary	independent	variables	were	included	in	the	regression.	If	some	factors	are	not	measurable	or	not	accountable	for	(say,	job	tenure)	and	for	example	men	are	better	 endowed	 than	 women	 with	 respect	 to	 these	 omitted	 variables,	 this	 would	 overestimate	discrimination.	Conversely,	if	some	of	the	factors	controlled	for	in	such	regressions,	like	occupation	and	 industry	 of	 employment,	 themselves	 describe	 a	 form	 of	 discrimination,	 then	 it	 will	 be	underestimated.	 However,	 as	 Blau	 and	 Kahn	 (2000)	 explain,	 results	 obtained	 using	 such	approaches	 may	 nonetheless	 be	 instructive,	 if	 carefully	 interpreted	 in	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	information	included	in	the	discrimination	coefficient.	Pooling	 data	 for	 different	 countries	 originates	 a	 multilevel	 structure	 of	 data,	 in	 which	observations	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 are	 nested	 within	 the	 country	 level.	 Relying	 on	 Bryan	 and	Jenkins	(2013),	and	as	done	 in	Perugini	and	Selezneva	(2015),	we	opt	here	 for	a	 fixed	effect	(FE)	estimation	 approach,	 i.e.,	 pooling	 the	 country	 surveys	 and	 including	 distinct	 country	 (and	 year)	intercepts.	 In	 the	simplest,	baseline	case	 the	 individual	effects	are	constrained	 to	be	equal	across	countries,	but	they	can	be	allowed	to	differ	between	countries	by	interacting	subsets	of	individual-level	characteristics	with	the	country	dummies.	The	use	of	country	fixed	effects	obviously	prevents	
the	 inclusion	 of	 additional	 country-level	 predictors	 in	 the	 empirical	 model,	 since	 the	 country	intercepts	 already	 fully	 encapsulate	 cross-country	 differences	 (Snijders	 and	 Bosker,	 1999).	However,	additional	country	level	variables	can	be	interacted	with	individual	level	variables,	so	to	obtain	the	additional	effect	that	a	country	level	factor	produces	on	the	main	(individual	level)	effect.	This	 is	 what	 is	 needed	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 our	 analysis,	 i.e.,	 estimating	 the	 effects	 of	 austerity	measures	 implemented	 at	 country	 level	 on	 the	 gender	wage	 gap,	 and	 is	 done	 by	 interacting	 the	(country	level)	AUS	indicators	with	the	gender	dummy.	Equation	2	describes	the	empirical	model	used	to	estimate	the	adjusted	gender	wage	gap	and	the	impact	of	austerity	in	the	pooled	EU-28	(28	countries,	4	years)	sample:		
lhwageik = consik +αnX ik +β1 femaleik +β2 femaleik ⋅ AUSk +τeastk +uk +λt +uk ⋅λt +υik 	 [2]		where	 subscripts	 i,	 k	 and	 t	 denote	 individuals,	 countries	 and	 years,	 respectively;	 uk 	denotes	country	 fixed	effects,	λt 	year	 fixed	effects	and	 their	 interaction	controls	 for	country/year	specific	factors.	The	dummy	variable	east	 is	1	for	the	former	communist	EU	members	and	zero	otherwise.	
Xik 	is	the	regressor	matrix	and	αn the	vector	of	associated	coefficients.	The	coefficients	β1 	and	 β2 	measure	 the	adjusted	gender	wage	gap	and	how	austerity	 impacts	on	 it.	υik is	 a	mean-zero	error	term.		 As	 customary	 in	 the	 literature	 (Bassanini	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Bourlès	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 the	policy/institutional	variables	 (AUS	 in	our	 case)	are	 lagged	 in	order	 to	alleviate	endogenity	 issues	and	 to	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies/reforms	 take	 time	 to	 become	effective.	We	therefore	estimate	equation	2	using	the	CAPB	change	lagged	one,	two	and	three	years.	In	order	to	test	whether	a	threshold	effect	exists	(i.e.,	only	changes	large	enough	are	able	to	produce	visible	effects),	we	also	estimate	equation	2	using	as	AUS	a	dummy	variable	(AUS_d)	that	is	1	if	the	annual	 change	 in	 CAPB	 exceeds	 0.5%	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 Robustness	 checks	 are	 run	 for	 different	thresholds	(CAPB	change	>0	or	>1%).	Following	Alesina	et	al.	(2015)	we	also	distinguish	measures	based	on	expenditure	cuts	or	tax	hikes.	This	is	done	by	decomposing	the	CAPB	dummy	variable	into	two	 dummies	 (TB_AUS_d	 and	 EB_AUS_d),	 indicating	 whether	 the	 consolidation	 plan	 was	(predominantly)	 tax	 based	 (TB)	 or	 expenditure	 based	 (EB).	 For	 each	 AUS_d=1,	 EB_AUS_d	 was	coded	1	if	the	change	in	the	cyclically	adjusted	structural	expenditures	(as	a	%	of	GDP)	was	higher	than	 the	 change	 in	 the	 cyclically	 adjusted	 structural	 revenues,	 and	 0	 otherwise;	 TB_AUS_d	 was	coded	 complementarily.	 Lastly,	 as	 done	 in	 section	 3.3,	 we	 test	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 fiscal	consolidation	plans	(rather	than	one-year	measures)	could	better	describe	the	impact	of	austerity	on	 the	gender	wage	gap.	We	 therefore	build	a	 cumulated	CAPB	variable	 (AUS_p	–	austerity	plan)	which,	for	year	t,	is	obtained	as	the	sum	of	the	CAPB	change	in	years	t-1,	t-2	and	t-3	(variable	named	AUS_p_3_L1).	For	a	robustness	check	we	also	use	a	similar	variable	but	cumulating	two	years	only	(AUS_p_2_L1).	As	done	 for	 the	annual	CAPB	changes,	we	transform	these	variables	 into	dummies,	coding	 them	 1	 if	 the	 cumulated	 CAPB	 exceeded	 1%	 and	 zero	 otherwise	 (AUS_p_3_d_L1	 and	AUS_p_2_d_L1).	Robustness	checks	were	run	for	different	thresholds	(cumulated	CAPB	>	0.5%	and	>	1.5%).	Again,	we	tested	for	the	possible	heterogeneous	effects	of	austerity	plans,	constructing	the	
two	corresponding	dummy	variables	(TB_AUS_p_d	and	EB_AUS_p_d).			 In	order	to	 investigate	whether	austerity	measures	 impact	on	the	horizontal	dimension	of	gender	 inequality,	 we	 also	 estimated	 the	 relationship	 between	 fiscal	 consolidation	 and	 the	probability	of	women	 to	be	employed	 in	sectors	with	different	wage	 levels.	The	choice	of	 sectors	(instead	of	occupations)	is	dictated	by	the	fact	that	industries	better	reflect	dynamics	of	horizontal	segregation,	being	occupations	at	least	partly	the	result	of	decisions	related	to	education,	personal	characteristics	 and	 skills	 (rather	 then	 of	 a	 sectorial	 choice).	 In	 addition,	 as	 emerged	 in	 the	 BO	decomposition	 presented	 in	 section	 3.2,	 gender	 asymmetries	 in	 occupations	 do	 not	 explain	 the	gender	wage	gap.	On	the	contrary,	sectorial	segregation	explains	on	average	13%	of	the	wage	gap,	since	men	disproportionately	work	in	better-paid	sectors.	From	2010	to	2013	this	share	increased	from	10%	to	15%	(see	section	3.2),	which	indicates	that	this	dimension	of	gender	inequality	tends	to	be	increasingly	important.	To	this	aim,	as	a	preliminary	step,	we	re-ranked	the	thirteen	sectors	from	the	lowest	to	the	highest	average	pay	in	each	country/year.	The	thirteen	ordered	sectors	have	been	rearranged	into	5	 ordered	 categories,	 so	 to	 have	 a	 balanced	 number	 of	 individuals9.	 This	 ordered	 variable	 -	sector(v),	ranging	from	1	to	5	-	is	then	used	to	estimate	the	following	ordered	logit	model:		
sec tor(v)ik =αnX ik +β1 femaleik +β2 femaleik ⋅ AUSk +τeastk +uk +λt +uk ⋅λt +υik 	 	 [3]		 where	symbols	and	variables	correspond	to	those	descripted	in	equation	2.	However,	since	the	variables	related	to	job	positions	(occupations,	second	job,	part-time,	permanent	employment,	size	of	the	firm)	are	to	some	extent	a	consequence	of	being	employed	in	a	given	sector,	we	also	run	the	same	model	excluding	them	from	the	set	 Xik ,	in	order	to	check	the	robustness	of	our	results.	As	explained	in	Cameron	and	Trivedi	(2010),	the	signs	of	the	regression	parameters	in	equation	3	can	be	 immediately	 interpreted	as	determining	whether	 the	 latent	dependent	variable	 increases	with	the	 regressor.	 A	 positive	 coefficient	 indicates	 that	 the	 associated	 regressor	 decreases	 the	probability	of	belonging	to	the	lowest	category	(sector	1)	and	increases	the	probability	of	belonging	to	the	highest	category	(sector	5).	A	last	important	empirical	aspect	that	needs	to	be	carefully	addressed,	already	mentioned	and	dealt	 with	 in	 section	 3.2,	 refers	 to	 the	 possible	 estimation	 bias	 due	 to	 sample	 selection.	 All	 our	empirical	 models	 are	 therefore	 estimated	 using	 a	 Heckman	 (1979)	 correction.	 The	 first	 stage	participation	 equation	 is	 estimated,	 as	done	 for	 the	Blinder-Oaxaca	decomposition,	 adding	 to	 the	personal	characteristics	used	in	equations	2	and	3,	variables	related	to	household	size,	the	number	of	children	(less	than	3,	4-6	and	7-15	years	old)	and	of	elderly	(65-74	and	over	75	years	old).	
	
																																																									9	Robustness	 checks	were	 run	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 ordered	 categories	 to	 3	 or	 keeping	 the	 13	 original	ordered	sectors.	
4.2 Results	Tables	2,	3	and	A3	in	the	Appendix	report	the	estimates	of	the	model	described	in	equation	2;	although	not	displayed,	 all	models	 include	 sector	 and	occupation	dummies	besides	 country,	 year	and	country/year	 fixed	effects.	 Similarly,	 they	all	 include	 the	 sample	 selection	correction	and	are	estimated	pooling	the	28	EU	countries	and	the	four	years	(2010-2013).	
	
Table	 2.	 The	 effects	 of	 austerity	 measures	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 (yearly	 and	 cumulative	
CAPB	changes)			 (1)	 		 (2)	 		 (3)	 		 (4)	 		 (5)	 		 (6)	 				 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Female	 -0.163	 ***	 -0.162	 ***	 -0.164	 ***	 -0.166	 ***	 -0.163	 ***	 -0.164	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Female*AUS_L1	 	 	 -0.001	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.001)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*AUS_L2	 	 	 	 	 -0.003	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.001)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*AUS_L3	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.004	 ***	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.001)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*	AUS_p_2_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.001	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.000)	 	 	 	Female*AUS_p_3_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.001	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.000)	 	Married	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Age	 0.224	 ***	 0.219	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.223	 ***	 0.223	 ***	 0.223	 ***		 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Age2	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.017	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Health	status	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Secondary	Ed.	 0.083	 ***	 0.082	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.082	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Tertiary	Ed.	 0.216	 ***	 0.214	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.215	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Full-time	 -0.037	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.037	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Second	Job	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.029	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	
	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	Permanent	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Firm	size	(11-49)	 0.064	 ***	 0.063	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Firm	size	(over	50)	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Urban	 0.037	 ***	 0.036	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.036	 ***	 0.036	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	East	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.370	 ***	 -0.939	 ***	 -1.364	 ***	 -1.368	 ***	 -1.366	 ***	
	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.011)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	Constant	 1.925	 ***	 1.937	 ***	 1.491	 ***	 1.918	 ***	 1.924	 ***	 1.921	 ***		 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	Obs	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	Adj.	R-Squ	 0.696	 		 0.695	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		
Note:	 All	 estimations	 include:	 sector,	 occupation,	 country,	 year	 and	 country*year	 dummies;	 sample	 selection	 correction.	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***,	**	and	*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	cent	level,	respectively.		 	
	 A	 first	 remarkable	 piece	 of	 information	 emerging	 from	 the	 results	 is	 their	 overall	 strong	stability	to	changes	in	explanatory	(country	level)	variables.	The	baseline	estimation	in	column	1	in	Table	2	shows	that	the	average	(adjusted)	gender	wage	gap	in	the	pooled	sample	is	16.3%,	which	obviously	corresponds	to	the	figure	reported	in	the	first	column	of	Table	1	(the	unexplained	part	of	the	gender	wage	gap).	The	coefficients	of	the	remaining	explanatory	variables	largely	correspond	to	ex-ante	expectations	and	inform	us	that	wages	increase	not	linearly	with	age	(the	age	variable	has	been	divided	by	10,	so	to	have	more	readable	coefficients),	education,	firm	size	and	in	urban	areas;	similarly,	 married	 individuals	 and	 those	 holding	 a	 permanent	 position	 earn	 more	 than	 their	counterparts	(ceteris	paribus).	In	our	sample,	part-time	jobs	are	associated	to	higher	hourly	labour	compensation	compared	to	 full-time	ones;	 this	might	be	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	part-time	 jobs	 the	reduction	in	monthly	wage	is	not	proportional	to	the	reduction	in	hours	worked.	As	a	consequence,	on	an	hourly	basis,	part-time	positions	are	better	remunerated.	This	outcome	is	in	contrast	with	the	literature	 on	 productivity/wage	 penalty	 for	 part-time	 workers,	 but	 consistent	 with	 alternative	empirical	evidence	showing	that	the	difference	tends	to	disappear	once	the	effects	of	self-selection	into	different	segments	of	the	labour	market	and	personal	and	job	characteristics	are	controlled	for	(see,	 for	 example,	 Rodgers,	 2004).	 Our	 outcomes	 also	 show	 that	 labour	 compensation	 for	dependent	work	decreases	as	health	status	deteriorates	as	well	as	for	those	workers	with	a	second	job.	 The	 controls	 for	 occupations	 and	 sectors	 provide	 the	 expected	 hierarchy	 of	 coefficients	 (not	reported	 for	 the	 sake	of	brevity,	but	available	upon	 request).	The	dummy	variable	 that	 identifies	workers	 from	 central	 and	 eastern	 European	 countries	 has	 the	 expected	 negative,	 statistically	significant	coefficient.		 As	far	as	the	focus	of	our	analysis	is	concerned,	columns	2-4	of	Table	2	show	that	austerity	measures	 implemented	 in	 years	 t-1,	 t-2	 and	 t-3,	 respectively,	 exacerbate	 gender	wage	 inequality,	with	 increasing	 momentum	 as	 time	 proceeds.	 For	 example,	 a	 1%	 increase	 in	 CAPB	 in	 year	 t-3	increases	by	0.4%	the	gender	wage	gap	in	year	t.	A	similar	detrimental	(and	statistically	significant)	effect	on	gender	equality	 is	played	by	austerity	plans	(2/3	years	cumulated	CAPB	changes	 lagged	one	year,	columns	5-6).	As	a	first	robustness	check,	but	also	in	order	to	investigate	the	possibility	that	 a	 dichotomic	measure	 of	 austerity	might	 provide	 clearer	 results,	we	 replace,	 in	 Table	 3,	 the	continuous	measures	of	CAPB	changes	with	the	dummy	variables	AUS_d	and	AUS_p_d	described	in	section	4.1.	Results	are	in	line	with	those	shown	in	Table	2,	i.e.,	austerity	increases	the	gender	gap,	but	 the	 size	 of	 the	 effect	 is	 remarkably	 larger,	 especially	 when	 austerity	 is	 identified	 as	 a	multi	annual	 consolidation	 plan:	 a	 cumulative	 CAPB	 change	 larger	 than	 1%	 in	 the	 preceding	 two	(AUS_p_2_d_L1)	and	three	(AUS_p_3_d_L1)	years,	increases	the	gender	wage	gap	by	1.4%	and	2.7%,	respectively.	 This	 evidence	 not	 only	 supports	 the	 view	 of	 austerity	 exacerbating	 gender	 gap	inequalities,	 but	 also	 indicates	 that	 sizable	 austerity	 plans	 are	 able	 to	 exert	 a	 conspicuous	 and	increasing	 effect	 over	 time.	 Robustness	 checks	 carried	 out	 altering	 the	 threshold	 of	 the	 dummy	variables	(AUS_d	>	0%	and	AUS_d	>1%	for	the	annual	CAPB	change;	AUS_p_d	>	0.5%	and	AUS_p_d	>	1.5%	 for	 the	 cumulated	 CAPB	 change)	 confirm	 the	 outcomes	 reported	 in	 Table	 3	 (they	 are	 not	reported	here	but	are	available	upon	request).	
Table	 3.	 The	 effects	 of	 austerity	 measures	 on	 the	 gender	 wage	 gap	 (yearly	 and	 cumulative	
CAPB	changes	as	a	dummy	variable)			 (1)	 		 (2)	 		 (3)	 		 (4)	 		 (5)	 				 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Female	 -0.159	 ***	 -0.158	 ***	 -0.162	 ***	 -0.159	 ***	 -0.156	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Female*AUS_d_L1	 -0.008	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 (0.002)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*AUS_d_L2	 	 	 -0.018	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.002)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*AUS_d_L3	 	 	 	 	 -0.008	 ***	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*	AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.014	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	 	 	Female*AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.027	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	Married	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.029	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Age	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***		 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Age2	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Health	status	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Secondary	Ed.	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Tertiary	Ed.	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Full-time	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.035	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Second	Job	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	
	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	Permanent	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Firm	size	(11-49)	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Firm	size	(over	50)	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Urban	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	East	 -1.367	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.372	 ***	
	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	Constant	 1.923	 ***	 1.921	 ***	 1.924	 ***	 1.921	 ***	 1.920	 ***		 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	Obs	 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		Adj.	R-Squ	 0.696	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		 0.696	 		
Note:	 All	 estimations	 include:	 sector,	 occupation,	 country,	 year	 and	 country*year	 dummies;	 sample	 selection	 correction.	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***,	**	and	*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	cent	level,	respectively.		
		 In	order	to	investigate	whether	there	is	a	difference	between	the	impact	on	gender	wage	gap	of	tax-based	and	expenditure-based	austerity	plans,	 in	Table	A3	in	the	appendix	we	replace	the	dummies	used	in	Table	3	with	those	calculated	separately	on	taxes	and	expenditures	changes	(TB_AUS_p_d	and	EB_AUS_p_d,	see	section	4.1).	Outcomes	confirm	the	detrimental	role	of	austerity	on	gender	equality	(therefore	confirming	the	robustness	of	our	findings)	and	indicate	that	the	effect	of	expenditures	cuts	tends	to	be	larger	than	that	of	tax	hikes	(although	their	difference	is	statistically	significant	in	only	one	case).	
	
Table	4.		Austerity	plans	and	sectorial	gender	segregation	Dep.	Var:	sectors	ordered	by	increasing	average	wage	 (1)	 		 (2)	 		 (3)	 		 (4)	 		Female	 -0.015	 **	 -0.013	 **	 -0.015	 **	 -0.013	 **	
	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Female*p_AUS_2_d_L1	 -0.114	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 (0.009)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*p_AUS_3_d_L1	 	 	 -0.144	 ***	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.010)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 -0.177	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.014)	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 -0.076	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.011)	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.162	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.018)	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.137	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.011)	 	Married	 0.041	 ***	 0.041	 ***	 0.041	 ***	 0.041	 ***		 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	Age	 0.561	 ***	 0.559	 ***	 0.561	 ***	 0.559	 ***		 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	Age2	 -0.054	 ***	 -0.054	 ***	 -0.054	 ***	 -0.054	 ***		 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	Health	status	 0.033	 ***	 0.033	 ***	 0.033	 ***	 0.033	 ***		 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	Secondary	Ed.	 0.275	 ***	 0.275	 ***	 0.275	 ***	 0.274	 ***		 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	Tertiary	Ed.	 0.543	 ***	 0.543	 ***	 0.543	 ***	 0.543	 ***		 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	Full-time	 0.069	 ***	 0.072	 ***	 0.071	 ***	 0.073	 ***	
	 (0.008)	 	 (0.008)	 	 (0.008)	 	 (0.008)	 	Second	Job	 -0.155	 ***	 -0.155	 ***	 -0.155	 ***	 -0.154	 ***	
	 (0.031)	 	 (0.031)	 	 (0.031)	 	 (0.031)	 	Permanent	 -0.005	 	 -0.005	 	 -0.005	 	 -0.005	 		 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	Firm	size	(11-49)	 0.473	 ***	 0.473	 ***	 0.473	 ***	 0.473	 ***	
	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Firm	size	(over	50)	 0.744	 ***	 0.744	 ***	 0.744	 ***	 0.744	 ***	
	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Urban	 -0.037	 ***	 -0.037	 ***	 -0.037	 ***	 -0.037	 ***	
	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	East	 0.539	 ***	 0.539	 ***	 0.539	 ***	 0.539	 ***		 (0.038)	 	 (0.038)	 	 (0.038)	 	 (0.038)	 	cut	1	 1.137	 ***	 1.135	 ***	 1.137	 ***	 1.135	 ***	
	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	cut	2	 2.156	 ***	 2.154	 ***	 2.156	 ***	 2.154	 ***	
	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	 (0.070)	 	cut	3	 3.189	 ***	 3.188	 ***	 3.190	 ***	 3.188	 ***	
	 (0.071)	 	 (0.070)	 	 (0.071)	 	 (0.070)	 	cut	4	 4.752	 ***	 4.751	 ***	 4.753	 ***	 4.751	 ***	
	 (0.071)	 	 (0.071)	 	 (0.071)	 	 (0.071)	 	Test	(Chi2)	EB_AUS=TB_AUS	 	 	 	 	 41.41	 ***	 1.59	 	Obs	 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 	Pseudo	R-Squ	 	0.0719	 		 0.0719		 		 0.0719		 		 0.0719		 	Note:	All	 estimations	 include	 country,	 year	and	 country*year	dummies;	 sample	 selection	 correction.	Columns	2	and	4	also	
include	occupation	dummies.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parenthesis.	***,	**	and	*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	
cent	level,	respectively	
		 Lastly,	we	 investigate	whether	 the	 implementation	of	austerity	measures	 impacted	on	 the	probability	 of	 women	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 high-wage	 sectors.	 From	 the	 decomposition	 analysis	presented	in	section	3.2	we	learnt	that	sectorial	employment	segregation	accounts,	on	average,	for	13%	of	 the	unadjusted	wage	gap,	hence	a	remarkable	portion	of	gender	wage	disparities.	Results	reported	 in	Table	4	(and	A4	 in	he	Appendix)	refer	 to	 the	estimation	of	equation	3	and	employ	as	dependent	 variable	 the	 ordered	 categorical	 variable	 (ranging	 from	1	 to	 5)	 that	 identifies	 sectors	with	ascending	average	wage.	Results	confirm	that	women	have	a	lower	probability	to	be	employed	in	high-pay	sectors;	in	addition,	they	clearly	suggest	that	the	implementation	of	fiscal	consolidation	measures	leads	to	a	further	decline	of	the	chances	of	female	workers	to	be	employed	in	better-paid	sectors.	If	we	distinguish	the	nature	of	austerity	measures/plans	(column	3	and	4	of	Table	4),	the	expenditure-based	ones	seem	to	exert	a	relatively	more	detrimental	role	on	gender	wage	inequality,	via	sectorial	employment	segregation	adverse	to	women.	This	outcome	is	soundly	confirmed	by	the	evidence	presented	in	Table	A4,	which	differs	from	Table	4	for	the	exclusion	of	job	related	control	variables	 that	might	 have	 captured	 some	 sectorial	 aspects.	 Further	 robustness	 checks	 have	 been	carried	out	reducing	the	number	of	ordered	sectors	to	three	and	increasing	it	to	thirteen.	Results,	not	displayed	here	but	 available	upon	 request,	 univocally	 confirm	 that	 austerity	 further	worsens	the	chances	of	women	to	be	employed	in	high-paid	sectors.		
5.	Discussion	and	final	remarks	The	 principal	 aim	 of	 this	 study	was	 to	 provide	 evidence	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	implementation	 of	 austerity	measures	 and	 gender	wage	 inequality.	Whilst	 the	 existing	 literature	offers	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 explanations	 as	 to	 how	 fiscal	 consolidation	 policies	 impacts	asymmetrically	on	women,	empirical	evidence	not	limited	to	pure	descriptive	methods	is	still	very	scanty.	Moreover,	many	studies	focus	on	the	effects	of	fiscal	contractionary	policies	on	quantitative	labour	market	aspects	such	as	female	employment,	unemployment	and	activity	rates,	whereas	their	consequences	 on	 gender	 wage	 discrimination	 and	 horizontal	 segregation	 remain	 largely	unexplored.	In	this	paper	we	tried	to	fill	this	gap	by	means	of	an	empirical	analysis	employing	EU-SILC	microdata	for	the	28	EU	member	states	in	the	period	2010-2013.	Our	findings	support,	on	different	fronts,	the	idea	of	austerity	being	detrimental	to	gender	equality.	A	 first	 sound	empirical	evidence	we	 found	 is	 that	of	a	positive	relationship	between	 the	implementation	 of	 austerity	 measures	 and	 gender	 wage	 inequality,	 after	 having	 accounted	 for	workers	and	 jobs	characteristics;	 in	other	words,	austerity	 favours	pure	discrimination	practices.	We	explain	 this	 result	 in	 the	more	general	 framework	of	statistical	discrimination,	 rather	 than	as	related	to	discriminatory	tastes	of	employees,	co-workers	or	customers	(Becker,	1957).	Statistical	discrimination	arises	 in	the	context	of	 incomplete	 information	when	employers,	 in	the	absence	of	information	on	the	individual	counterparts,	use	group	averages	to	predict	skills	and	productivity	of	the	 individuals	 in	 the	 group	 (Phelps,	 1972;	 Aigner	 and	 Cain,	 1977).	 It	 is	 therefore	 a	 rational	response	to	pay	lower	wages	to	individuals	belonging	to	the	group	with	higher	heterogeneity	in,	or	lower	 expected	 values	 of,	 productivity.	 In	 our	 conceptual	 framework,	 austerity	 measures	 might	
have	 driven	 downwards	 employers’	 expectations	 on	 women	 productivity.	 The	 extensive	 budget	cuts	 on	 the	 supply	 of	 care	 services,	 described	 in	 section	 2,	 likely	 fed	 the	 expectation	 of	 lower	availability,	 continuity	 and	 flexibility	 of	 female	 labour.	 Similarly,	 grater	 family	 care	 loads	 (for	children	 and	 elderly),	 typically	 charged	 disproportionately	 on	 women,	 probably	 decreased	 their	ability	 to	 provide	 the	 expected	 level	 of	 effort	 on	 the	 job.	 Also,	 austerity	measures	 often	 took	 the	form	 of	 cuts	 in	 pensions,	 limited	 or	 frozen	 access	 to	 early	 retirement	 and	 postponements	 of	retirement	 age:	 such	measures	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 aggravated	 the	 family	workload	 on	women,	 by	reducing	their	reliance	on	grandparents	for	childcare.		Besides	impacting	directly	on	the	pay	that	female	workers	are	able	to	negotiate	vis-à-vis	the	employer,	 these	 mechanisms	 might	 explain	 the	 exacerbation	 of	 horizontal	 segregation	 that	emerged	from	our	analysis.	Our	second	main	result	is	indeed	that	austerity	reduced	the	already	low	(compared	 to	 men)	 probability	 of	 women	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 high-pay	 sectors.	 This	 indicates	 a	deterioration	 of	 women’s	 capacity	 to	 attain	 high-paid	 job	 positions	 in	 general,	 for	 which	 the	presence	 of	 heavier	 family-related	 tasks	 poses	 relevant	 constraints.	 Jobs	 in	 high-pay	 sectors	normally	imply	high	flexibility	and	adaptability	(time-	and	space-wise),	but	also	high	continuity	on	the	 job,	 necessary	 to	 accumulate	 specific	 experience	 that	 complements	 formal	 education	 (see	Perugini	 and	 Pompei,	 2016).	 The	 inability	 of	 women	 to	 supply	 such	 assets,	 in	 a	 context	 of	decreasing	provisions	 of	 family	 care	 services,	may	 seriously	 impact	 on	 their	 capacity	 to	 compete	with	men	in	attaining	such	jobs.	The	 third	 important	 evidence	 we	 have	 obtained	 is	 that	 austerity	 impacts	 negatively	 on	women	equality	not	only	when	it	is	based	on	expenditure	cuts,	but	also	on	tax	hikes	(although	the	effect	tends	to	be	quantitatively	weaker).	Higher	taxation	inevitably	translates	into	lower	individual	and	household	disposable	 income.	 In	a	context	of	gender	wage	 inequality	and	widespread	budget	cuts	that	generate	an	increasing	need	for	unpaid	family	work,	a	reduction	in	household	disposable	income	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 reinforcement	 of	 the	 male	 bread-winner	 model.	 The	 reduction	 of	household	disposable	income	might	indeed	drive	the	division	of	labour	within	the	family	in	favour	of	the	breadwinner	(more	frequently,	the	man)	for	the	working	time,	while	family	care	tasks	being	charged	on	lower	income	recipients	(normally,	the	woman).	These	mechanisms	might	reinforce	the	patterns	that	feed	the	already	describe	weaknesses	in	women’s	bargaining	power	and	job	positions.		 Our	study	is	one	of	the	first	attempts	to	provide	quantitative	evidence	on	the	adverse	effects	of	austerity	on	gender	wage	equality.	One	priority	on	the	research	agenda	is	to	update	the	analysis	as	soon	as	microdata	for	the	most	recent	years	(2014	and	2015)	are	rendered	available.	Our	results	clearly	show	that	the	effects	of	fiscal	consolidation	on	gender	gap	take	time	to	fully	unfold;	since	the	bulk	 of	 austerity	measures	was	 implemented	 in	 Europe	 after	 2011,	 this	means	 that	 further	 bad	news	is	still	to	come.	The	implications	of	our	results,	if	confirmed,	would	not	be	small.	The	ideology	on	which	the	desirability	of	austerity	is	based	will	at	least	need	to	add	to	the	list	of	side	effects	the	worsening	of	one	of	the	most	loathsome	forms	of	inequality,	that	one	based	on	gender.	Similarly,	for	European	policy	makers	wishing	to	promote	development	patterns	balanced	with	equity	concerns,	the	evidence	presented	here	 suggests	 that	 the	way	of	public	budget	balance	 consolidation	brings	
along	consequences	on	various	sides	of	gender	inequality,	that	can	put	at	risk	the	little	progress	so	far	achieved.	
	 	
APPENDIX	
	
Table	A1.	Adjusted	gender	wage	gap	in	EU-28	countries,	2010-2013	
	
	 Country	 Obs.	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	AT	 Austria	 17827	 0.144	 0.14	 0.149	 0.131	BE	 Belgium	 17823	 0.102	 0.092	 0.096	 0.101	BG	 Bulgaria	 17896	 0.183	 0.202	 0.173	 0.167	CY	 Cyprus	 16168	 0.260	 0.249	 0.213	 0.184	CZ	 Czech	Republic	 26381	 0.242	 0.242	 0.243	 0.239	DE	 Germany	 39421	 0.13	 0.158	 0.143	 0.145	DK	 Denmark	 19947	 0.139	 0.132	 0.145	 0.144	EE	 Estonia	 18625	 0.278	 0.31	 0.327	 0.313	EL	 Greece	 11434	 0.142	 0.099	 0.088	 0.057	ES	 Spain	 32202	 0.140	 0.138	 0.153	 0.115	FI	 Finland	 29865	 0.150	 0.159	 0.148	 0.129	FR	 France	 35742	 0.086	 0.106	 0.075	 0.108	HR	 Croatia	 14235	 0.143	 0.147	 0.142	 0.153	HU	 Hungary	 33236	 0.141	 0.147	 0.134	 0.126	IE	 Ireland	 11818	 0.100	 0.085	 0.099	 0.112	IT	 Italy	 47893	 0.112	 0.098	 0.086	 0.103	LT	 Lithuania	 15860	 0.136	 0.172	 0.185	 0.193	LU	 Luxembourg	 18335	 0.091	 0.078	 0.060	 0.069	LV	 Latvia	 17923	 0.203	 0.176	 0.198	 0.206	MT	 Malta	 13692	 0.091	 0.092	 0.084	 0.123	NL	 Netherlands	 37079	 0.129	 0.134	 0.130	 0.134	PL	 Poland	 37672	 0.136	 0.136	 0.142	 0.137	PT	 Portugal	 17811	 0.154	 0.16	 0.150	 0.173	RO	 Romania	 18488	 0.129	 0.116	 0.105	 0.095	SE	 Sweden	 23609	 0.163	 0.166	 0.181	 0.163	SI	 Slovenia	 35828	 0.158	 0.170	 0.173	 0.143	SK	 Slovakia	 22695	 0.193	 0.186	 0.185	 0.197	UK	 United	Kingdom	 17827	 0.147	 0.109	 0.116	 0.128	
	 All	 677702	 0.165	 0.166	 0.162	 0.16	
Note:	Our	elaborations	on	EU-SILC;	AMECO	and	OECD	(2016)	data;	all	coefficients	significant	at	1%	level	
	
	 	
	
Table	A2.	Austerity	in	EU-28	(yearly	CAPB	change),	2007-2013	
	Country	 	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	AT	 Austria	 -0.37	 -0.37	 -0.27	 -0.19	 0.70	 0.60	 0.50	BE	 Belgium	 -0.60	 -0.60	 -2.09	 -0.02	 -0.20	 0.60	 0.40	BG	 Bulgaria	 0.00	 0.00	 -3.80	 1.00	 0.70	 1.80	 -0.30	CY	 Cyprus	 -2.70	 -2.70	 -4.30	 0.60	 -0.10	 1.20	 3.90	CZ	 Czech	Republic	 -0.59	 -0.59	 -0.99	 1.19	 1.50	 1.30	 1.40	DE	 Germany	 0.04	 0.04	 0.37	 -1.67	 0.70	 0.70	 0.10	DK	 Denmark	 -0.24	 -0.24	 -2.22	 -0.65	 0.30	 0.20	 -0.30	EE	 Estonia	 -0.33	 -0.33	 3.21	 0.83	 0.10	 -0.50	 -0.20	EL	 Greece	 -1.40	 -1.40	 -2.21	 6.20	 5.20	 3.90	 0.80	ES	 Spain	 -5.19	 -5.19	 -3.77	 1.37	 1.20	 3.60	 1.70	FI	 Finland	 -0.47	 -0.47	 -1.48	 -1.66	 0.20	 -0.20	 -0.30	FR	 France	 0.60	 0.60	 -2.07	 -0.09	 1.00	 0.80	 0.30	HR	 Croatia	 -0.40	 -0.40	 0.90	 0.40	 -1.30	 3.70	 0.60	HU	 Hungary	 1.49	 1.49	 2.41	 -1.59	 -0.90	 3.40	 -0.10	IE	 Ireland	 -4.12	 -4.12	 -0.89	 0.97	 1.90	 1.90	 2.30	IT	 Italy	 -0.46	 -0.46	 -0.71	 -0.17	 0.30	 2.70	 -0.10	LT	 Lithuania	 -1.00	 -1.00	 1.30	 2.20	 -0.30	 1.20	 0.10	LU	 Luxembourg	 0.93	 0.93	 -0.44	 -1.80	 1.20	 1.20	 -0.40	LV	 Latvia	 -0.30	 -0.30	 1.30	 2.90	 0.90	 1.10	 -1.10	MT	 Malta	 -2.40	 -2.40	 2.70	 -1.70	 1.40	 -0.90	 0.70	NL	 Netherlands	 0.20	 0.20	 -1.80	 -0.84	 0.00	 1.20	 1.10	PL	 Poland	 -1.25	 -1.25	 -2.64	 -0.39	 2.20	 2.20	 0.40	PT	 Portugal	 -0.66	 -0.66	 -4.14	 0.18	 3.20	 3.80	 0.40	RO	 Romania	 -3.30	 -3.30	 0.00	 3.20	 2.60	 0.70	 1.50	SE	 Sweden	 -0.05	 -0.05	 0.72	 -1.95	 -0.60	 -0.10	 -0.30	SI	 Slovenia	 -1.18	 -1.18	 0.02	 0.59	 0.00	 2.80	 0.50	SK	 Slovakia	 -0.60	 -0.60	 -1.70	 -0.20	 3.20	 0.70	 2.00	UK	 United	Kingdom	 -0.27	 -0.27	 -2.39	 1.28	 1.70	 -0.90	 1.90	
Source:	Database	Ameco	(2010	onwards)	and	our	elaborations	on	Ameco	database	and	OECD	(2016)	for	2007-2009	
	
	 	
Table	 A3.	 The	 effects	 of	 tax	 based	 and	 expenditure	 based	 austerity	measures	 on	 the	 gender	
wage	gap	(yearly	and	cumulative	CAPB	changes	as	a	dummy	variable)			 (1)	 		 (2)	 		 (3)	 		 (4)	 		 (5)	 		Female	 -0.159	 ***	 -0.158	 ***	 -0.162	 ***	 -0.159	 ***	 -0.156	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Female*EB_AUS_d_L1	 -0.007	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_d_L1	 -0.009	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 (0.002)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_d_L2	 	 	 -0.021	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_d_L2	 	 	 -0.017	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_d_L3	 	 	 	 	 -0.022	 ***	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_d_L3	 	 	 	 	 0.003	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.003)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.016	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.003)	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.012	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.026	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.004)	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.027	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	 	Married	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.030	 ***	 0.029	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Age	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.223	 ***	 0.224	 ***	 0.224	 ***	
	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	 (0.006)	 	Age2	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	 -0.018	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Health	status	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***	 -0.015	 ***		 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Secondary	Ed.	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***	 0.083	 ***		 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Tertiary	Ed.	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	 0.216	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Full-time	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.036	 ***	 -0.035	 ***	
	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	 (0.002)	 	Second	Job	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	 -0.028	 ***	
	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	 (0.010)	 	Permanent	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***	 0.115	 ***			 (0.002)	 		 (0.002)	 		 (0.002)	 		 (0.002)	 		 (0.002)	 		Firm	size	(11-49)	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	 0.064	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Firm	size	(over	50)	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	 0.151	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	Urban	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	 0.037	 ***	
	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	 (0.001)	 	East	 -1.367	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.371	 ***	 -1.372	 ***			 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)	 	Constant	 1.923	 ***	 1.921	 ***	 1.924	 ***	 1.921	 ***	 1.920	 ***		 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	 	Test	(F)	EB_AUS=TB_AUS	 0.59	 	 1.11	 	 31.55	 ***	 1.39	 	 0.03	 	Obs	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	 677702	 	Adj.	R-Squ	 0.696	 	 0.696	 	 0.696	 	 0.696	 	 0.696	 	Note:	 All	 estimations	 include:	 sector,	 occupation,	 country,	 year	 and	 country*year	 dummies;	 sample	 selection	 correction.	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	***,	**	and	*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	cent	level,	respectively.	
	 	
	
Table	A4.	Austerity	plans	and	sectorial	gender	segregation	(no	job	variables)	Dep.	Var:	sectors	ordered	by	increasing	average	wage	 (1)	 		 (2)	 		 (3)	 		 (4)	 		Female	 -0.050	 ***	 -0.043	 ***	 -0.050	 ***	 -0.043	 ***	
	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	Female*AUS_p_2_d_L1	 -0.067	 ***	 	 	 	 	 	 		 (0.009)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Female*AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 -0.103	 ***	 	 	 	 		 	 	 (0.010)	 	 	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 -0.104	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.014)	 	 	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_2_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 -0.045	 ***	 	 		 	 	 	 	 (0.011)	 	 	 	Female*EB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.080	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.018)	 	Female*TB_AUS_p_3_d_L1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.110	 ***		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.011)	 	Married	 0.043	 ***	 0.043	 ***	 0.043	 ***	 0.043	 ***		 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	Age	 0.630	 ***	 0.629	 ***	 0.630	 ***	 0.629	 ***		 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	 (0.027)	 	Age2	 -0.056	 ***	 -0.056	 ***	 -0.056	 ***	 -0.056	 ***		 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	Health	status	 -0.044	 ***	 -0.044	 ***	 -0.044	 ***	 -0.044	 ***		 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	 (0.003)	 	Secondary	Ed.	 0.433	 ***	 0.433	 ***	 0.433	 ***	 0.433	 ***		 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	 (0.007)	 	Tertiary	Ed.	 1.390	 ***	 1.390	 ***	 1.390	 ***	 1.390	 ***		 (0.009)	 	 (0.009)	 	 (0.009)	 	 (0.009)	 	Urban	 0.049	 ***	 0.049	 ***	 0.049	 ***	 0.049	 ***	
	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	 (0.005)	 	East	 0.430	 ***	 0.431	 ***	 0.430	 ***	 0.431	 ***		 (0.036)	 	 (0.036)	 	 (0.036)	 	 (0.036)	 	cut	1	 0.700	 ***	 0.699	 ***	 0.698	 ***	 0.699	 ***	
	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	cut	2	 1.642	 ***	 1.642	 ***	 1.641	 ***	 1.642	 ***	
	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	cut	3	 2.594	 ***	 2.593	 ***	 2.593	 ***	 2.593	 ***	
	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	cut	4	 4.050	 ***	 4.050	 ***	 4.049	 ***	 4.049	 ***	
	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	 (0.068)	 	Test	(Chi2)	EB_AUS=TB_AUS	 	 	 	 	 14.03	 ***	 2.36	 	Obs	 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		 677702	 		Pseudo	R-Squ	 	0.0352	 		 	0.0352	 		 	0.0352	 		 	0.0352	 		
Note:	All	 estimations	 include	 country,	 year	and	 country*year	dummies;	 sample	 selection	 correction.	Columns	2	and	4	also	
include	occupation	dummies.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parenthesis.	***,	**	and	*	denote	significance	at	the	1,	5	and	10	per	
cent	level,	respectively	
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